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Publication date:
2009

Citation for published version (APA):

Jones, R. L. W., & Scully, R. (2009). *The Public Legitimacy of Devolution in Scotland and Wales*. 28-31.
<http://hdl.handle.net/2160/1854>

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The Public Legitimacy of Devolution in Scotland and Wales

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Paper prepared for delivery at the 2008 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 28-31, 2008

The relationship between government and people has long been the defining concern for much political enquiry. Considerable work in political theory has been devoted to addressing the proper limits of government authority, and the rights that citizens should have in relation to that authority. But important strands of normative political thought have also investigated the government-people relationship in terms of the duties and obligations owed to authority by citizens, and the conditions under which authority should be granted acceptance and even loyalty.¹ This latter concern – the circumstances under which citizens accept governing authority as legitimate – also forms a persisting and central theme for empirical political enquiry. Indeed, this concern has been given renewed priority in recent times, both by the investigation of public attitudes to the new democratic regimes established across much of the world (Bratton et al 2004; Evans and Whitefield 1995), and because of perceptions of declining public legitimacy within many of the world's more established democracies (Anderson and Guillory 1997; Dalton 2004; Norris 1999).

The practical implications of the degree of legitimacy granted to government authority by the public have long been disputed. Warren Miller, for one, is reputed to have contended that declining public trust in the political system was 'the most dramatic trend in American public opinion...to have no apparent effect on citizen behaviour' (cited in Dalton 2004: 157). But an accumulated body of international evidence now tends to the conclusion that public attitudes to a system of government do have important consequences. Lower levels of public endorsement have been found to be linked to specific behavioural consequences – such as lesser degrees of public compliance with taxation and census laws (Dalton 2004, ch.8; Kornberg and Clarke 1992; Schloz and Lubell 1998) – but also to be associated with greater citizen willingness to support radical institutional change (Cain et al 2003; Dalton et al 2001; Shugart and Wattenberg 2001), or to offer support to non-mainstream, and even violent, paths of political activity (Craig and Wald 1985; Muller and Seligson 1982). Put simply, the public legitimacy of a political structure is a fundamental pillar of its stability. As one recent study of the subject has observed:

The weaker its legitimacy, the less a government can rely on the obedience or support of its subjects when it comes under stress... The stability of a political order could be modelled as a relation between the strength of its legitimacy and the force of the pressures to which it is exposed (Beetham and Lord: 1998: 9-10).

In 1999, new governing institutions were created in two of the constituent nations of the United Kingdom, Scotland and Wales. The creation of the Scottish Parliament (SP), and the National Assembly for Wales (NAW) gave the two nations substantial political autonomy,² and constituted one of the greatest constitutional upheavals in the three hundred year history of the United Kingdom. There has been considerable work conducted on numerous aspects of devolution.³ And yet, a decade

¹ The duty owed to authority by citizens is perhaps most prominent in the work of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, but is of course a central theme for many theorists. For important contemporary discussions of the legitimacy of political authority, see Pateman (1985), Horton (1992).

² Anthony King has observed of Scottish devolution that "[t]here has probably never in any country been a greater voluntary handover of power by a national government to a subnational body within its own borders" (2007: 193).

³ An important collection of political science perspectives on devolution can be found in Jeffery and Wincott (2006).

into this major constitutional experiment, we still know very little about its legitimacy with the people of Scotland and Wales and thus about an important pillar for the long-term stability of this governing arrangement.

Our paper seeks to remedy this deficiency in our knowledge. It is structured as follows. First, we consider the concept of public legitimacy and its relevance to the assessment of devolved government in Scotland and Wales. Next, we explore in detail how public attitudes towards devolution have developed in the two nations, assessing the extent to which such attitudes have changed over the past decade and the degree to which self-government within the UK can now be regarded as having attained legitimacy with the public. Having explored this, we then move on to assess the factors that shape public attitudes. We outline two main alternative routes – the *consequentialist* and the *deontological* – towards legitimation; we then assess the extent to which variables associated with each help to explain public attitudes towards devolution. Finally, the conclusion considers the implications of the findings for understandings of public attitudes towards devolution in Scotland and Wales, and for the future stability of the governmental arrangements now in place in these two nations.

Legitimacy and Devolution

What is Public Legitimacy? The concept of legitimacy has been central to a great deal of political enquiry, but like many political concepts it has not acquired a settled meaning or clear referent. Rather, legitimacy has been understood in a variety of ways, and applied to a considerable range of political phenomena.⁴ To provide a clear focus to our study, it is important that we define precisely how we understand legitimacy, and for what purposes the concept will be applied.

First, our focus here is on *public* legitimacy. This means, quite simply, that our enquiry is concerned with the extent to which the mass publics of Scotland and Wales accord legitimacy to devolution. This is a different matter – and necessitates different methods of enquiry – from work that might explore the legitimacy accorded to political authority by some or other set of political, social or cultural elites.

Second, to distinguish between some important categories identified in the theoretical literature, we are concerned here with the *normative* legitimacy of particular structures of political authority, rather than their *legal* or *formal* legitimacy (Beetham and Lord 1998: 3-4). Put more simply, our focus here is on perceptions of the rightfulness of their (continued) existence, rather than on whether those structures have been established, or power within them is being wielded, in accord with certain proper procedures.

Third, in talking about the public legitimacy of devolution in Scotland and Wales we are concerned with attitudes towards devolution as a form of *political regime* (Dalton 2004; Easton 1965). As such, we are not concerned with the legitimacy of the *political community* (with the integrity of Scotland or Wales as recognised entities); nor are we concerned with the legitimacy of a particular set of

⁴ It was Jurgen Habermas (1976) who famously posited the existence of a 'legitimation crisis' in modern societies. Clark (2005) provides an important application of the concept of legitimacy in modern international politics; Hurd (2007) consider legitimacy more specifically in the context of the United Nations Security Council.

political authorities (a specific government).⁵ The political regime operates at a level between the community and the authorities: the term regime connotes, within a particular, self-defined community, the broad system and structures within and through which a particular set of political authorities wield political power.

In short, we are concerned with legitimacy in the sense defined by Lipset (1959: 77): “the capacity of the system to engender and maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones for the society”. To talk of the public legitimacy of devolution is to be concerned with whether a substantial proportion of people within Scotland and Wales do, in fact, have the sort of beliefs that Lipset outlined. To the extent that they do, this should be manifest in broad, reasonably deep-rooted, public acceptance of the basic structures of devolved government, rather than necessarily in the immediate or specific approval of current office-holders within the devolved institutions, or the policies that those individuals are currently pursuing. As Caldeira and Gibson aver, “[c]itizens may disagree with what an institution does but nevertheless continue to concede its authority as a political decision maker.” (1995: 357).

Public Legitimacy and Devolved Government: During the early-to-mid 1990s there was some evidence of declining support for, and trust in, the political system across the UK (Clarke et al 2004: 293; Curtice and Jowell 1997). These negative trends in public attitudes helped underpin the agenda for constitutional change that was developed by the Labour party in opposition, and then largely implemented in government after the party’s victory in the UK general election in 1997. But particular problems were perceived to exist in Scotland and, to a lesser extent, Wales.

For much of the eighteen years of Conservative rule from 1979-97, these two nations experienced rule by a government that enjoyed very limited public support but nonetheless proceeded with the implementation of some highly unpopular policies.⁶ At least some members of the political class in Scotland and Wales began to talk of a ‘democratic deficit’, as these largely non-Conservative nations were not having their political preferences reflected in the nature of the government that ruled over them.⁷ In short, the legitimacy of the political regime was beginning to be challenged.

⁵ Dalton further distinguishes three aspects of support for a political regime: support for the Principles of the regime, support for the Norms and Procedures under which it operates, and support for the Institutions of the regime. However, he acknowledges that, in practice, “it is often difficult to draw such fine distinctions” (2004: 7). Our examination of the public legitimacy of devolution is primarily concerned with the third aspect here: the legitimacy of the Scottish Parliament and National Assembly for Wales as institutions through which substantial public authority is now being wielded. However, it also clearly incorporates elements of the first aspect as well: the legitimacy of the principle that Scotland and Wales should be partially self-governing entities within the UK state.

⁶ The Conservative party has for some years been appreciably less electorally successful in Scotland and Wales than in England. By the 1987 UK general election, the party won only 10 of 72 parliamentary seats in Scotland, and 8 of 38 from Wales, despite retaining a substantial majority in England (357 of 523 seats). Shortly after the 1987 election, the Conservative UK government proceeded to introduce a poll tax/‘Community Charge’ for local services; although this tax was deeply unpopular, it was actually introduced in Scotland a year earlier than in England and Wales. Earlier in the life of the 1979-1997 Conservative government, policies to raise interest rates to tackle inflation and to reduce public subsidies for publicly-owned heavy industries had hit areas of central Scotland and south Wales (where the overwhelming majority of the population of the respective nations live) particularly hard.

⁷ For discussion of how perceptions of a ‘democratic deficit’ emerged, see Wright (1997) and Harvie and Jones (2001) on Scotland and Morgan and Mungham (2000) on Wales.

The policy of devolution for Scotland and Wales was developed in the late-1980s and early-1990s – or, to be more precise, revived after its failure in the 1970s⁸ – as a response to that challenge. In Scotland, the policy was developed through a broad-ranging movement that encompassed several political parties and a swathe of civic society organisations meeting in a Constitutional Convention (Lynch 1996). In Wales, by some contrast, the devolution proposals that were eventually enacted emerged through a process concentrated much more narrowly inside the hegemonic Labour party (Morgan and Mungham 2000).⁹ Devolution was an attempt to ‘square the circle’; very much in the tradition of Prime Minister Gladstone’s agenda for Irish Home Rule in the 19th century, and of regionalist reforms in other states,¹⁰ it sought to accommodate the concerns of minority nations by giving them partial autonomy through their own, elected institutions, while keeping them at the same time still firmly within the United Kingdom.

Public endorsement for the creation of a Scottish Parliament and National Assembly for Wales was given in referendums held in the two nations in September 1997. But the strength of the endorsement given was strikingly different. In Scotland, the creation of the devolved legislature was supported by an almost three-to-one majority.¹¹ In Wales, the margin of victory for those in favour of devolution was a mere 6,721 votes (0.6% of those cast).¹²

These results would seem to indicate that, in 1997 at least, there was a far greater degree of support for the principle of devolution in Scotland than in Wales. But this is not necessarily the case. The referendums offered voters in Scotland and Wales the choice between greater self-government within the UK and the constitutional status quo of no devolution. These are not, however, the only conceivable constitutional options. Nationalist parties in Scotland and Wales have for many years advocated independence for their respective nations.¹³ Devolution constitutes essentially a middle course between the full self-government represented by independence, and the constitutional *status quo ante*. It is entirely possible that a substantial part of the ‘Yes’ vote in Scotland in 1997 comprised those preferring that

⁸ A policy of devolution to Scotland and Wales – similar, though not identical to that actually carried out in the 1990s – had been advanced by the Labour government of the UK in the 1970s. This policy faced strong opposition in parliament, including from many members of the governing party. Referendums were held on March 1, 1979, in both nations. In Scotland, devolution won the support of a narrow majority (51.6% voting in favour, 48.4% against); however, this majority was insufficient to clear a hurdle imposed by parliament – namely that, to be enacted, devolution needed also to win the support of 40% of the registered electorate. In Wales, devolution was rejected overwhelmingly by the people (20.3% voting in favour, compared to 79.7% against).

⁹ Paterson and Wyn Jones (1999) directly compare the different processes by which the devolution agenda was developed in Scotland and Wales.

¹⁰ For general discussions of developing programmes of regionalism across a number of states, see Dillinger (1994), Keating (1998).

¹¹ The referendum, on 11th September 1997, saw 1,775,045 votes cast in favour of the creation of a Scottish Parliament (74.3% of the votes cast) and 614,000 votes cast against (25.7%). A second question was also asked in the referendum: whether the parliament should be granted ‘tax-varying powers’. This was also passed, with 1,512,889 votes in favour (63.5%) and 870,263 (36.5%) against.

¹² In the Welsh referendum on 18th September 1997, 559,419 (or 50.3%) votes were cast in favour of the establishment of a Welsh Assembly, 552,698 (49.7%) were opposed.

¹³ Plaid Cymru for many years – until late 2003 – shied away from using the term ‘Independence’, while advocating ‘Full National Status for Wales’ as its ultimate goal. In practice, full national status as envisaged by Plaid had a high degree of functional equivalence with independence as the latter is generally understood. For a detailed examination of Plaid’s awkward relationship with the idea of ‘independence’, see Wyn Jones (2007: ch.3).

Scotland be governed as an independent state outside the UK, but who regarded devolution as an advance towards this ideal point.

Moreover, whatever was the exact position at the time of the referendums, it is plausible to think that the landscape of public attitudes will have changed substantially over the following decade. One potential reason for change is disappointment. It is far from self-evident that devolution has been able to live up to the very high level of public expectations that had developed in Scotland and Wales by the late-1990s.¹⁴ Indeed, some of the most memorable events associated with the new devolved institutions have been failures: the enforced resignations of First Ministers in both Scotland and Wales;¹⁵ difficulties in achieving effective policy delivery in areas like health and education (Greer 2004; Greer and Rowland 2007; Rees 2005); and very public embarrassments surrounding the construction of permanent headquarters for the Parliament and the Assembly.¹⁶

While some work has explored public attitudes to devolution in the years since its establishment (Curtice 2004, 2005, 2006; Wyn Jones and Scully 2003), there has been no sustained investigation of the public legitimacy of devolution. We thus know very little about the extent to which this major constitutional innovation has come to be accepted as the appropriate form of government by the people of Scotland and Wales. Is devolution legitimate? And, if so, from where does such legitimacy derive? The rest of the paper will address these questions.

Measuring the Legitimacy of Devolution

Institutions perceived to be legitimate are those with a widely accepted mandate to render judgments for a political community (Gibson et al 2003: 356).

The notion of public legitimacy does not necessarily equate to any specific threshold of public support for a political regime. Nor has any specific threshold for notions like 'a widely accepted mandate' been established in the comparative literature that explores the public legitimacy of political institutions.¹⁷ In order to address our question of whether devolution can be adjudged to have attained legitimacy with the people of Scotland and Wales, we propose to establish minimum criteria. We advance two: one negative and one positive.

The negative criterion is that, to be adjudged as having a secure public legitimacy, a system of government should not face any substantial body of

¹⁴ On the high expectations of devolution in the late-1990s, see Surridge and McCrone (1999) on Scotland and Wyn Jones and Trystan (1999) on Wales.

¹⁵ In Wales, the original First Minister, Alun Michael of the Labour party, was forced to resign in February 2000; Michael had been faced with certain defeat in a No Confidence vote in the NAW, ostensibly on the issue of securing matching funds from the UK government to allow Wales to take full advantage of EU Objective 1 assistance, but in reality grounded in a widespread lack of confidence in Michael's abilities. In Scotland, Henry McLeish (also of the Labour party, who became First Minister in 2000 after the sudden death of Donald Dewar) was forced to resign in November 2001 over the mishandling of expenses claims by his office.

¹⁶ The construction of a permanent building for the Scottish Parliament, in particular, proved the source of considerable public disquiet. The building, originally scheduled for completion in 2001 at a cost of £40m, was eventually opened in 2004 at a final estimated cost of over £400m (White and Sidhu 2005).

¹⁷ The absence of an established threshold for the legitimacy of institutions reflects, in part, the emphasis of most work on legitimacy being a variable quantity – institutions are judged to be more or less legitimate, rather than legitimate 'yes or no?'. But it also reflects the difficulty of comparing attitudes towards different institutions, often measured at different times, using different methods.

opposition that goes as far as to regard the authority of such government structures as wholly and irredeemably unacceptable. This criterion is far from merely hypothetical: the authority of government in much of the world is challenged by substantial sections of the populations over which those governments aspire to exercise authority. Such political movements can go beyond challenging specific actions of governments, and contest the very basis on which the political community or the political regime is constructed. Such a situation prevailed for much of the 20th century in part of the UK – namely Northern Ireland. There, a system of devolved government within the UK operated for several decades in the face of absolute opposition from a significant minority of the population of Northern Ireland, which refused to accept the legitimacy of such a form of governance.¹⁸ But judged on this criterion, the legitimacy of devolution does not currently face any significant challenge in either Scotland or Wales. There are no well-organised groups pursuing the abolition of devolution, no major political parties in either nation that remain fundamentally opposed to devolution, and no campaigns of resistance (whether armed or passive) to the authority of the Scottish Parliament or the Welsh Assembly.¹⁹

The positive criterion we advance is that it would be difficult to regard a political regime as enjoying public legitimacy if it did not command the support of at least a bare majority of citizens. The ‘fifty percent-plus-one’ threshold is the minimum consistent with regarding an institution or system of government as possessing a ‘widely accepted mandate’.

To apply this latter criterion to the devolved institutions in Scotland and Wales, we draw on evidence from a series of surveys conducted in both countries between 1997 and 2007. All these surveys have included a common question that enquires directly into respondents’ most preferred form of government for their nation. Four broad options are given:

- Independence;
- Remaining part of the UK, but with their own Parliament, with substantial law-making and some tax powers;
- Remaining part of the UK, with a devolved Assembly having only limited law-making powers; and
- No Devolution.

TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

Findings from both Scotland and Wales for 1997-2007 are presented in Table 1. The results show support for abolishing devolution and returning to the *status quo ante* to have remained distinctly limited in Scotland. Although the numbers endorsing this option have at no point been wholly negligible, and indeed experienced

¹⁸ Opposition to the Stormont administration in Northern Ireland came overwhelmingly from the minority Catholic population. In Dalton’s terminology, this was grounded principally in opposition to how the boundaries of the political *community* had been drawn, rather than principled opposition to the political regime. However, civil rights movements that developed in the 1960s also drew attention to fundamentally discriminatory aspects of the manner in which the political regime operated (Tonge 2002).

¹⁹ In the 2007 elections to the Scottish Parliament and National Assembly for Wales, the only remotely substantial political party which campaigned on a platform of fundamental opposition to devolution was the United Kingdom Independence Party. The party gained 4.0% of the regional list vote in Wales, and only 0.4% in Scotland, and won no seats in either institution.

something of a short-term rise around 2004 (when negative publicity surrounding the delays and spiralling costs of the new Scottish Parliament building was at its height), the proportion favouring this option has never reached even one-in-five. However, this does not mean that the numbers endorsing devolution within the UK constitute a secure majority in Scotland. This is because a substantial proportion of respondents support taking self-government for Scotland as far as full Independence. Support for Independence has always been above one-quarter of respondents (except in 2007), and sometimes approaches forty per cent. When combined with the rather smaller numbers of people in Scotland wishing to abolish devolution altogether, this means that the proportion of respondents favouring some form of devolution (those choosing either the Assembly or the Parliament option) is below fifty percent in several years. On the positive criterion set out above, we cannot say that the public legitimacy of devolution as a form of government is necessarily securely established in Scotland.

The figures for Wales look rather different to those in Scotland, in at least two respects. First, and most perhaps obviously, support for Independence is much more limited in Wales than in Scotland. In none of the years for which we have data does the proportion of respondents choosing this constitutional option reach even fifteen percent. The second difference with Scotland is that the data for Wales show some very clear – indeed, monotonic – trends. These trends do not concern the numbers supporting the Assembly option, which have experienced no more than trend-less fluctuation. But the number of people supporting a return to the status quo ante of No Devolution has fallen substantially. From receiving the support of a clear plurality of nearly forty per cent in 1997, the proportion choosing this option declined to well below one-in-five respondents a decade later. And, in sharp contrast, the number of respondents preferring the Parliament option has grown steadily, to well above two-in-five in the most recent data. In consequence, the overall level of support for devolution (the Assembly and Parliament options combined) has been comfortably above fifty percent in all surveys from 1999 onwards, with support reaching over seventy percent by 2007. Thus, notwithstanding the much stronger public endorsement given to devolution in Scotland in the 1997 referendums, in more recent years – at least according to the positive criterion we advanced earlier – the public legitimacy of devolution has actually been greater in Wales.

To summarise, the evidence from this section has suggested two conclusions for the legitimacy of devolution. In relation to the negative criterion of legitimacy we proposed, it is clear that devolution faces no little or no absolutist opposition in either Scotland or Wales. In relation to the positive criterion specified, the picture is a little more complex. There have been substantial, and largely consistent, levels of support for self-government in Scotland over the past decade. But the legitimacy of *devolution* faces a significant challenge from the alternative of independence. In Wales, support for self-government has increased considerably in the last ten years. With no tide of support for independence, the legitimacy of devolution here has become quite securely established.

Alternative Sources of Public Legitimacy

The previous section of the paper showed the evolution of public attitudes towards devolution over the last decade in Scotland and Wales, and assessed this evidence in relation to a specified criterion for evaluating the public legitimacy of devolution. What we did not do was attempt to explain public attitudes – to consider, to the extent

that people do accord legitimacy to devolution, on what basis they might do so. This latter question is what we now address.

Public attitudes to a political regime, such as that of devolved government within Scotland and Wales, might potentially be shaped by an infinite number of individual influences. However, drawing on the extant empirical literature on the legitimacy of political regimes, and in particular on work on the justifications offered for devolution in the UK, it is possible to specify some plausible hypotheses regarding systematic sources of influence on public attitudes. We divide these potential sources into two broad types: the consequentialist and the deontological.

Consequentialist Influences on Public Attitudes: A first plausible set of influences on public attitudes to devolution in Scotland and Wales is what Kay's theoretical analysis of justifications for Welsh devolution terms *Consequentialism*: the notion that devolution, if it is to be valued, is to be "desired on the grounds that it is believed to have good or desirable effects" (2003: 51).²⁰ The emphasis here is very much on the practical consequences of this constitutional innovation: what difference having a Scottish Parliament or National Assembly for Wales has had, or might have.²¹

There is little doubt that citizens' attitudes to political institutions can be shaped in a consequentialist manner. A much-celebrated example is the experience of the Federal Republic of Germany in the years after World War II, where the success of the newly-established democratic polity in delivering prosperity along with political and social stability generated a broader public support for the institutions and principles of the Federal Republic (Boynton and Loewenberg 1973; Baker et al 1981). In David Easton's (1965) widely-borrowed terminology, specific support for the successful policies of the West German government appeared to generate diffuse support for the broader political regime.

There are also good reasons for believing that such factors should be important in explaining public attitudes to devolution. The 1997 referendum campaigns accorded great priority to consequentialist arguments. The ruling Labour party, in particular, sought very much to underplay any suggestion that devolution should be justified as a measure of national recognition for Scotland or Wales. Rather, the emphasis was placed much more on the practical consequences. In Wales, for instance, "the stated purpose of devolution was to produce better government rather than, say, give 'proper' constitutional recognition to Welsh nationhood" (Wyn Jones 2001: 37).

The practical consequences of devolution can, in turn, be divided into two categories: material and non-material. The material consequences of devolution concern their impact on public welfare and the effective delivery of government policies. The comparative literature remains somewhat inconclusive about the extent to which perceptions of effective policy delivery are an *essential* ingredient for diffuse public support for political institutions to develop (e.g. Dalton 2004, ch.3). But even if not a necessary condition, it remains a strong possibility. Detailed research on

²⁰ We should note that Kay (2003) is himself very dubious that consequentialist reasoning could provide an adequate or convincing justification for devolution.

²¹ To the extent that consequentialist influences are important in shaping public attitudes, they may function either retrospectively – citizens coming to support political arrangements like devolution because of the practical benefits that it has delivered – or prospectively – where attitudes are shaped by expected benefits in the future. However, as no adequate measures of prospective evaluations are available in our data, our empirical analysis will concentrate on exploring the impact of retrospective evaluations.

Scottish voting behaviour in the 1997 referendum has argued that expectations of effective policy delivery were far more powerful factors in driving the victory of devolution than were, for instance, matters relating to Scottish national sentiment: “people supported a Parliament because they believed that it would improve the quality of public welfare in Scotland” (Brown et al 1999: 122). Given this background, there is at the very least a strong *prima facie* case to expect material consequentialism to be a significant influence in shaping public attitudes to devolved government.

However, the consequences of devolution are not necessarily limited to material ones. Kay’s (2003) articulation of consequentialism also points to potential non-material effects. The introduction of new structures of government for Scotland and Wales may well have come to be associated in the public mind with specific policy consequences. But it is also highly plausible that many citizens perceive devolution to have had an impact, for better or worse, on the process and practices of government: how, and by whom, the Scots and Welsh are governed. ‘How’ themes were, indeed, explicitly highlighted in Scotland and Wales in the 1990s, where devolution was linked with the idea of a ‘New Politics’. Advocates of devolution proposed a model of how politics was to operate in the new, devolved institutions that was deliberately contrasted with how politics was alleged to be practiced at Westminster. The New Politics of devolution, it was suggested, would not merely bring government physically closer to the people of Scotland and Wales, but would also make political life more ‘open’, more ‘inclusive’ and less confrontational (e.g. Osmond 1998). There is considerable room for doubt as to whether these aspirations have been wholly realised (Chaney and Fevre 2001; Mitchell 2000). Nonetheless, they do suggest one plausible source of influence on public attitudes: public perceptions of the impact of devolution on the *process* of government and politics, aside from any material consequences that devolution may be perceived to have had.

A related, but still somewhat distinct potential source of influence on public attitudes is the fact that devolution has served to bridge the democratic deficit alleged to have been opened up during the pre-devolution era of Conservative government. Executive office in the Scottish Government, and the Welsh Assembly Government, has at all times been in the hands of political parties commanding a much more substantial electoral mandate than the Conservatives managed in the late-1980s or 1990.²² Aside from its material consequences, or its impact on how people are governed, devolution may have come to attract public support simply because it has provided Scotland and Wales with governments more attuned to their partisan and political sensibilities than those which prevailed in preceding years.

Deontological Influences on Public Attitudes: While public attitudes to devolution may well be shaped by the material or non-material consequences it is perceived to have had, there are nonetheless good reasons to hypothesise that other types of influence could also be of considerable importance. Such has been the lesson of much

²² Ministerial offices in the Scottish Government, as it is now termed (the Scottish Executive from 1999-2007) were held during the 1999-2003 parliamentary term by a Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition which had won 73 of the 129 seats in the 1999 Scottish Parliament election; and during the 2003-07 term by an identical coalition with 67 of the 129 seats. The current Scottish National Party minority administration holds 47 seats. For the majority of the first term of the Welsh Assembly, a Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition prevailed: this held 33 of the 60 seats. A single party Labour administration held power throughout the second term; Labour had won 30 seats in the 2003 election. The 2007 election eventually produced a Labour-Plaid Cymru coalition government, with 41 of the 60 Assembly seats.

of the body of comparative research conducted, which has found that “the satisfactions that members of a system feel they obtain from the perceived outputs and performance of the political authorities... is only indirectly relevant, if at all, to the input of support for the regime or political community” (Easton, 1975: 437). At the very least, it can often be the case that while specific support contributes to diffuse support, it is far from wholly accounting for it. And there are good reasons to believe that such has been the case in Scotland and Wales. In the most detailed examination of public reactions to devolution conducted hitherto, Curtice demonstrated that public preferences on how these nations should be governed were only modestly associated with consequentialist evaluations:

Those who think that the [Scottish] Parliament or [Welsh] Assembly has not made any difference do not in fact hold very different views about the merits of devolution from those that do... at any one point in time support for the principle of devolution has not been closely related to perceptions of the performance of the devolved institutions (2005: 122).

An alternative approach to understanding the factors shaping public attitudes in Scotland and Wales is given by Kay’s notion of *Deontological* justifications for devolution. This, put simply, is the idea that devolution is not justified or valued primarily for its material consequences; instead, “devolution is thought to be inherently valuable” (2003: 51). As so defined, deontologism is the direct (indeed, tautologous) converse of consequentialism: virtue attached to devolution that does not arise from its consequences must, by definition, be innate.

The clearest reason why the granting of partial self-government to Scotland and Wales could be regarded as having deontological virtue is that devolution offers political recognition, and substantial autonomy, to Scotland and Wales as *nations*. By raising their political standing at least to a similar level as that enjoyed by other prominent non-state nations (such as the Basques and Catalans in Spain), devolution may be fulfilling a valuable function in the eyes of many people. And the converse is also true: some may oppose devolution precisely because by giving political recognition to Scottishness and Welshness, it may appear to downplay the unifying importance of Britishness. In short, there is substantial scope for public attitudes to devolution to be shaped by the politics of national recognition.

Explaining Public Attitudes to Devolution

Our empirical analysis seeks to estimate the relationship between public attitudes to devolution in Scotland and Wales and a set of explanatory variables derived directly from the hypothesised sources of influence on public attitudes outlined above. The dependent variable for the analysis is responses to the Constitutional Preference question as set out in Table 1. The dependent variable therefore has four categories: No Devolution, Assembly, Parliament, and Independence. (Precise codings for the dependent variable, and all independent variables, are set out in Appendix 2).

Given that the dependent variable comes with a limited number of response categories, and no obvious interval-level relationship between those categories, OLS regression is not an appropriate functional form for our analysis. Nor, for our specific purposes here, is an ordered logit/probit model. The latter would appear potentially of use, as there is a clear ordering to the four categories of the dependent variable

according to the extent of self-government they represent (from none at one end of the spectrum to full independence at the other). However, our concern here is specifically with support for *devolution*; we therefore need to be able to distinguish between support for the Assembly and Parliament options from endorsement either of No Devolution or Independence. Ordered model forms, which return a single set of coefficients for all response categories, do not readily permit this (O'Connell 2006). Our multivariate models for public attitudes in Scotland and Wales therefore deploy multinomial logistic regression (Long and Freese 2006).

Three broad categories of explanatory variable are used. The first category comprises several basic socio-demographic control variables: these specify the Age, Gender and (objectively measured) Social Class of respondents. Some of the very limited body of work examining public attitudes to devolution has suggested that these variables may be of explanatory importance (Wyn Jones and Scully 2003); they are therefore included as control variables, to avoid potential problems with omitted variable bias.

The second category of explanatory variables we include comprises those that are specified in order to try to tap into consequentialist influences on public attitudes. In relation to material consequentialism, we specify three variables that measure the perceived impact of devolution on outcomes in three key areas of public policy: the management of healthcare provision, the effectiveness of education policy, and impact on the economic standard of living.²³ But we also develop several variables directly linked to non-material consequentialism. First, we include two variables measuring respondents' perceptions that devolution has had a beneficial impact on the process of government. These variables are derived from survey respondents' replies to questions asking whether they believed devolution had 'improved the way Britain as a whole is governed' and whether it was 'giving ordinary people more say in how Scotland/Wales is governed'.²⁴ Second, to assess the hypothesis that individuals' attitudes to devolution have been shaped by their sense that it has helped deliver government more in tune with their political preferences, we include a series of dummy variables for the partisan identification of respondents. If this hypothesis is well-founded, would expect support for devolution to be particularly high among identifiers with the Labour and Liberal Democrat parties, who held office in Scotland and Wales at the time that the survey data was gathered.

The final category of explanatory variables specified is directly related to the deontological justification for devolution outlined above. To gauge the extent to which public attitudes towards devolution are shaped by the politics of national recognition, we include a series of dummy variables recording the national identity of respondents – measured on the now-standard 'Moreno' scale which allows for varying degrees of identification with Scotland/Wales and Britain.

²³ There are potential problems with endogeneity in the relationship between constitutional preferences and our consequentialist variables. That is, while we specify policy evaluations as a variable potentially helping to explain constitutional preferences, it is plausible that the causal relationship may run at least partly in the other direction – i.e. that an individual's views on how Scotland/Wales should be governed strongly condition how they evaluate the policy impact of devolution. We are unable, within our current modelling approach, to make empirical allowance for this problem. We can note, however, that it potentially inflates the impact of the consequentialist variables, and interpret the results accordingly.

²⁴ As with our consequentialist variables, there are some potential problems of endogeneity in the relationship between public evaluations of the impact of devolution on the process of government and constitutional preferences. As with the consequentialist variables, we do not make any statistical adjustment for this factor, but do interpret the coefficients produced in light of this knowledge.

These independent variables are included in multinomial logistic regression models run separately for Scotland and Wales.²⁵ (The reference category for the dependent variable is No Devolution.) Maximum likelihood estimates (with robust standard errors) are presented in Tables 2 and 3. These display parameters for each category of the dependent variable except the reference category: the parameters constitute the log odds of membership in category j compared to the reference category m .

TABLES 2 AND 3 ABOUT HERE

The results show that, notwithstanding the substantial differences in the landscape of public attitudes between the two nations, there are considerable commonalities between Scotland and Wales in terms of the variables most strongly associated with support for the differing constitutional options. In both Scotland and Wales, we find only a rather limited impact for the socio-demographic variables. In Scotland, female respondents are more supportive of the Parliament option, while there are some social class differences. Working class respondents are somewhat more likely to endorse Independence, while those in the generalised non-manual sector tend towards favouring only limited devolution. In Wales, there is a slightly stronger and more consistent pattern of younger respondents being significantly more supportive of self-government, and a modest association between membership of the Salariat and opposition to Independence. But the overall picture that emerges is that these socio-demographic variables contribute little either statistically or substantively to explaining public attitudes towards how Scotland and Wales should be governed.²⁶

Second, it is very striking that the material consequentialist variables specified have little relationship with public attitudes. In Scotland, none of the variables attain statistical significance at the .05 level; moreover, the coefficient that comes closest to significance indicates an association between positive policy attributions on the economy and support for the Assembly option (i.e. support for *more limited* devolution!). There is a modestly significant and positive relationship between policy attributions on Education and support for the Parliament option in Wales. But positive policy attributions on the economic standard of living are actually associated – albeit again only modestly – with support for full Welsh Independence. There is certainly no strong and consistent relationship between perceptions of policy delivery and attitudes to devolution in either Scotland or Wales.²⁷

A similarly modest impact on the dependent variable can also be observed for our deontological variables, the national identity dummies. National identity does help predict attitudes towards Independence: exclusively Scottish and Welsh identifiers are much more likely to endorse this constitutional option, while those proclaiming equal degrees of Scottish and British identity are significantly more likely to oppose it. But there are no significant relationships between any of the national identity variables

²⁵ The multivariate analysis is conducted on data drawn from the 2003 surveys in Scotland and Wales. Limitations in the data available make it impossible to develop as fully-specified explanatory models for both Scotland and Wales in more recent years.

²⁶ The modest impact of the socio-demographic variables is confirmed in models restricted to only these variables, which produce few significant coefficients and a very low model fit in both countries.

²⁷ The weak association between the material consequentialist variables and public attitudes on how Scotland and Wales should be governed is not a function of colinearity between independent variables. The relationship remains weak even in a restricted model including only the socio-demographic and material consequentialist variables.

and attitudes to *devolution*. Support for (and opposition to) devolution is not grounded primarily in the direct expression of the politics of national recognition.

The results of the analysis suggest that constitutional preferences in Scotland and Wales are most satisfactorily explained by factors that we associated with non-material consequentialism. Here again, the relationships observed are distinctly similar in the two countries. Conservative identifiers are strongly opposed to Independence, and Nationalist party identifiers strongly supportive of it, in both Scotland and Wales. But identification with the nationalist parties is also associated with support for devolution, despite these parties not having been in power at the time the data was collected. Nationalist identifiers almost uniformly support self-government – and far from all of them, particularly in Wales, wish this to go as far as Independence. Supporters of the parties in power at the time of the survey – Labour and the Liberal Democrats – were more favourable to devolution in Wales, but only Labour identification was linked with support for a Parliament in Scotland. Thus, while party loyalties are linked with attitudes to devolution, that association is not necessarily based on loyalty to the parties that devolution has most directly empowered.

But by far the strongest degree of association with the dependent variable is found for those independent variables concerned with the impact of devolution on the process of government. Although the precise interpretation of this statistical relationship is complicated by the possibility of endogeneity – that pre-existing support for the principle of self-government partially shapes individuals' responses towards these questions – the relationship is nonetheless very strong.

The substantive impact of this relationship can be more readily appreciated through the results presented in Table 4. These results, generated using CLARIFY software (King et al 200; Tomz et al 2003), translate the coefficients from our full multinomial logistic regression into predicted probabilities, across the full range of values of these two independent variables, of respondents in Scotland and Wales choosing one of the four constitutional options. Thus, an individual in Scotland thinking that devolution had made the way Britain is governed 'a lot worse' had approximately a 46% probability of selecting 'No Devolution' as their preferred constitutional option; a person thinking that devolution had made 'no difference' in this respect had a 9% probability of favouring No Devolution, and one thinking that devolution had made things 'a lot better' had only a 1% probability of opting for No Devolution. These substantive differences are even more striking in Wales. Those thinking that devolution had made the government of Britain 'a lot worse' had a 71% probability of favouring No Devolution, and only a 10% probability of choosing the Parliament option; those thinking that devolution had made things 'a lot better' in this respect had only a 2% probability of favouring No Devolution, and a 58% probability of favouring a full Parliament for Wales. Similarly, those thinking that devolution had 'given ordinary people more say' in how Wales is governed had only a 9% probability of favouring No Devolution compared with a 33% probability for those believing that it had given such people 'less say'.

TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE

Those believing that partial self-government for Scotland and Wales has improved the system of government, and given ordinary people more say in how their particular nation is governed are much more likely than others to support some measure of self-government for Scotland and Wales. But such attitudes about the

impact of devolution on the process of government do not necessarily equate to support for devolution. For some individuals, at least, they do. But for others, such perceptions appear to amount to good reasons to take self-government even further; as far, indeed, as full Independence.

Conclusions

A fundamental underpinning for the stability of any political regime is its legitimacy with those over whom that regime is to exercise authority. And that legitimacy is perhaps particularly in question when authority is vested in new political structures. Devolution to Scotland and Wales has been a very substantial constitutional experiment within the United Kingdom; a decade into that experiment, it is important to ascertain the extent to which it has attained legitimacy with the people over whom a new form of government now functions, and the basis on which public attitudes to it are formed.

We have seen that self-government for Scotland and Wales not only does not face a concerted public challenge; the principle in fact has come to enjoy considerable support in both nations. In Scotland, support for a return to the constitutional *status quo ante* has remained low. The challenge to partial self-government there comes now not from those wishing to abolish self-government, but those wishing to remove the 'partial' qualifier. In Wales, public attitudes have undergone a substantial, indeed dramatic, evolution. Opposition to devolution has fallen considerably, and is now at well under half the level witnessed in 1997. Support for an independent Wales has not, however, increased to any significant extent. Devolution is increasingly the settled will of the Welsh people, even if the exact form of that devolution remains distinctly unsettled.

The basis for those public attitudes has been established more clearly. Except for some generational differences, public attitudes in Scotland and Wales do not divide substantially on social lines. Nor, despite the explicit suggestions of many of those who campaigned for devolution, are attitudes to it driven by public perceptions of the material consequences of devolution. Rather, attitudes are partly linked to national and partisan identities, but most strongly associated with perceptions of how devolution has altered the process of government. Self-government to at least some extent has achieved a secure legitimacy in Scotland and Wales. That it has done so appears to be largely because, to the people of Scotland and increasingly the people of Wales, self-government has come to be viewed as the appropriate political expression of how they wish to be governed.

Table 1: Constitutional Preferences 1997-2007, Scotland and Wales*A. Scotland*

<i>Constitutional Preference</i>	<i>1997</i>	<i>1999</i>	<i>2000</i>	<i>2001</i>	<i>2002</i>	<i>2003</i>	<i>2004</i>	<i>2005</i>	<i>2006</i>	<i>2007</i>
Independence	38.9	28.3	31.1	28.4	31.6	27.4	34.2	37.5	32.6	24.9
Parliament	33.5	52.7	49.0	55.7	46.4	51.2	42.6	40.9	50.4	57.1
Assembly	9.5	8.9	7.9	6.0	8.7	7.9	4.9	6.9	7.4	7.9
No elected body	18.1	10.0	12.0	9.8	13.4	13.6	18.3	14.8	9.6	10.0
<i>Weighted N</i>	643	1414	1607	1543	1561	1422	1553	1429	1483	1428

B. Wales

<i>Constitutional Preference</i>	<i>1997</i>	<i>1999</i>	<i>2001</i>	<i>2003</i>	<i>2006</i>	<i>2007</i>
Independence	14.1	9.6	12.3	13.9	11.5	12.2
Parliament	19.6	29.9	38.8	37.8	42.1	43.8
Assembly	26.8	35.3	25.5	27.1	25.0	27.5
No elected body	39.5	25.3	24.0	21.2	21.3	16.5
<i>Weighted N</i>	641	1173	1044	935	955	837

Sources: see Appendix 1

Table 2: Multinomial Logit Estimates (Robust Standard Errors) for Constitutional Preference Model, Scotland (2003)

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Assembly</i>	<i>Parliament</i>	<i>Independence</i>
Socio-Demographic Variables:			
Gender	- .17 (.31)	.64 (.23)**	.20 (.26)
Age:			
18-24	.18 (.88)	1.23 (.67)	1.24 (.72)
25-34	.25 (.46)	.46 (.36)	.46 (.41)
35-44	.46 (.43)	.52 (.33)	1.05 (.37)**
45-54	.11 (.44)	.36 (.33)	.55 (.39)
55-64	-.38 (.44)	.18 (.30)	.34 (.37)
Social Class:			
Salariat	.18 (.43)	-.25 (.30)	-.23 (.35)
Petty Bourgeoisie	-.46 (.70)	-.23 (.37)	.03 (.48)
Other non-manual	1.35 (.52)**	.47 (.38)	.49 (.44)
Foremen etc	.75 (.56)	.31 (.48)	.47 (.52)
Working Class	.73 (.47)	.25 (.33)	.87 (.37)*
Consequentialist Variables:			
Health	-.15 (.36)	.39 (.25)	.38 (.29)
Education	-.59 (.40)	-.11 (.24)	-.13 (.29)
Economy	.90 (.46)	.25 (.37)	.05 (.41)
Improved Government of UK	.86 (.20)***	1.12 (.16)***	.92 (.19)***
Ordinary People More Say In Govt	.60 (.25)*	.88 (.20)***	1.16 (.22)***
Party ID:			
Conservative	-.34 (.43)	-.39 (.29)	-1.89 (.40)***
Labour	.66 (.38)	.86 (.30)**	.01 (.32)
LibDem	.45 (.50)	.52 (.36)	-.79 (.44)
SNP	.54 (.83)	1.42 (.65)*	1.97 (.66)***
Deontological Variables:			
National ID:			
Scot not Brit	-.37 (.55)	.44 (.44)	1.28 (.48)**
More Scottish	-.69 (.51)	.18 (.40)	-.11 (.46)
Equal Scot/Brit	-.90 (.51)	-.54 (.40)	-1.61 (.48)**
More British	-.08 (.73)	.22 (.60)	-1.36 (.98)
Intercept	-.61 (.74)	.13 (.53)	-.31 (.59)
Initial Log Likelihood = 1651.99			
Model Improvement = 355.28			
Pseudo R ² = .22			
Weighted N = 1413			

* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001

Table 3: Multinomial Logit Estimates (Robust Standard Errors) for Constitutional Preference Model, Wales (2003)

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Assembly</i>	<i>Parliament</i>	<i>Independence</i>
Socio-Demographic Variables:			
Gender	.00 (.24)	.35 (.24)	- .07 (.29)
Age:			
18-24	1.29 (.65)*	1.74 (.60)**	1.85 (.70)**
25-34	1.21 (.41)**	1.33 (.40)**	1.82 (.47)***
35-44	.52 (.34)	.46 (.34)	.92 (.44)*
45-54	.30 (.34)	.36 (.35)	.71 (.46)
55-64	.40 (.34)	.28 (.36)	.48 (.45)
Social Class:			
Salariat	- .19 (.35)	.07 (.35)	-1.03 (.47)*
Petty Bourgeoisie	- .35 (.44)	- .18 (.42)	- .55 (.52)
Other non-manual	.08 (.36)	.38 (.37)	- .33 (.46)
Foremen etc	.19 (.47)	.31 (.48)	- .43 (.58)
Working Class	.06 (.35)	.17 (.34)	.08 (.39)
Consequentialist Variables:			
Health	.35 (.26)	.37 (.27)	- .01 (.35)
Education	.35 (.33)	.66(.32)*	.35 (.37)
Economy	.34 (.34)	.54 (.37)	.90 (.45)*
Improved Government of UK	1.19 (.20)***	1.46 (.23)***	1.55 (.30)***
Ordinary People More Say In Govt	.86 (.21)***	.76 (.23)**	.65 (.27)*
Party ID:			
Conservative	.47 (.36)	.02 (.36)	-1.14 (.47)*
Labour	.98 (.32)**	.65 (.30)*	- .24 (.36)
LibDem	2.04 (.49)***	1.66 (.47)***	.14 (.64)
Plaid Cymru	1.93 (.68)**	2.31 (.66)***	1.95 (.68)**
Deontological Variables:			
National ID:			
Welsh not British	- .11 (.40)	.75 (.41)	1.24 (.49)**
More Welsh	- .06 (.37)	.66 (.38)	.09 (.50)
Equal Welsh/British	- .30 (.34)	.00 (.36)	- .15 (.45)
More British	- .10 (.44)	.40 (.46)	- .10 (.62)
Intercept	-1.01 (.48)*	-1.41 (.50)**	-1.28 (.59)*
Initial Log Likelihood = 1250.44			
Model Improvement = 200.31			
Pseudo R ² = .16			
Weighted N = 943			

* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001

Table 4: Predicted Probabilities of Choosing Constitutional Options, Scotland and Wales 2003*

A. Scotland

	<i>No Devolution</i>	<i>Assembly</i>	<i>Parliament</i>	<i>Independence</i>
<i>Devolution Improved Government?</i>				
Improved Lot	.01	.05	.73	.21
Improved Little	.03	.06	.68	.23
No Difference	.09	.08	.60	.23
Little Worse	.22	.08	.48	.22
Lot Worse	.46	.08	.30	.16
<i>Devolution Given People More Say?</i>				
More Say	.04	.05	.62	.29
No Difference	.09	.08	.62	.20
Less Say	.19	.12	.56	.13

B. Wales

	<i>No Devolution</i>	<i>Assembly</i>	<i>Parliament</i>	<i>Independence</i>
<i>Devolution Improved Government?</i>				
Improved Lot	.02	.25	.58	.15
Improved Little	.05	.29	.51	.15
No Difference	.17	.31	.39	.12
Little Worse	.43	.26	.23	.09
Lot Worse	.71	.15	.10	.04
<i>Devolution Given People More Say?</i>				
More Say	.09	.35	.43	.13
No Difference	.18	.29	.40	.13
Less Say	.33	.23	.33	.11

*Entries are predicted probabilities for respondents choosing each constitutional preference. Probabilities were computed using CLARIFY software in Stata, on the basis of the results obtained in Tables 2 and 3. All variables in the multinomial logistic regression models were set to their mean values, except for the indicated variables.

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Appendix 1: Data Sources

Scotland: All data drawn from Scottish Social Attitudes (SSA) surveys. SSA surveys have been conducted annually since 1999 by the National Centre for Social Research, with initial financial support from the Economic and Social Research Council.

Fieldwork is conducted face-to-face. (For further details, see:

http://www.natcen.ac.uk/natcen/pages/or_socialattitudes.htm#ssa)

Wales: Data drawn from the 1997 Welsh Referendum Study; 1999 Welsh National Assembly Election Survey; 2001 and 2003 Welsh Life and Times Surveys; a 2006 survey conducted by GfKNOP for the Electoral Commission; and the 2007 Welsh National Assembly Election Study. All studies except 2006 were co-directed by the Institute of Welsh Politics (Aberystwyth) and the National Centre for Social Research, with fieldwork conducted by the National Centre for Social Research. All surveys conducted face-to-face except 1999 (split sample: approximately 50% face-to-face, 50% telephone) and 2006 (100% telephone).

Appendix 2: Variables Used in Multivariate Analysis

Variable	Survey Question	Codings
DEPENDENT VARIABLE		
Constitutional Preference	‘Which of these statements comes closest to your view?’	No Devolution Assembly Parliament Independence
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES		
<i>Socio-Demographic Variables:</i>		
Age of Respondent		Age in Years, grouped (Reference Category: 18-24 years old)
Gender		‘0’ male, ‘1’ female
Social Class Categories:		‘1’ if member of class category, ‘0’ otherwise (Reference Category: No social class given)
<i>‘Consequentialist’ Variables:</i>		
	<p>“Would you say that since [1999] the standard of the health service/quality of education/standard of living in Wales/Scotland has increased or fallen?”</p> <p>“Who do you think this has mainly been the result of?”</p>	<p>Health Education Economy (Each variable coded ‘-1’ if respondent according responsibility for perceived decline to Devolved government in any of three areas; ‘1’ if respondent according responsibility for perceived improvement to Devolved government in any of three areas; ‘0’ otherwise)</p>
Improved Government of Britain	‘Do you think that so far creating the [Devolved Institution] has improved the way Britain as a whole is governed, made it worse, or has it made no difference?’	<p>‘2’ improved a lot ‘1’ improved a little ‘0’ made no difference ‘-1’ made it a little worse ‘-2’ made it a lot worse</p>

People More Say	<p>‘From what you have seen and heard so far, do you think having a [Devolved Institution] is giving ordinary people more say in how Scotland/Wales is governed, less say, or is it making no difference?’</p>	<p>‘1’ more say ‘0’ no difference ‘-1’ less say</p>
Party Identification	<p>‘Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as...?’, and ‘Do you generally think of yourself as a little closer to one of the parties than the others?’</p>	<p>Labour Conservative Liberal Democrat Plaid Cymru (Coded ‘1’ if identifying with a party, ‘0’ otherwise)</p>
<i>‘Deontological’ Variables:</i>		
National Identity	<p>‘Which, if any, of the following best describes how you see yourself?’</p>	<p>‘1’ if choosing identity category, ‘0’ otherwise (Reference category: ‘British not Scottish/Welsh’)</p>